A BRIDGE TO FIRMER GROUND:

LEARNING FROM INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCES TO SUPPORT PATHWAYS TO SOLUTIONS IN THE SYRIAN REFUGEE CONTEXT

CHAPTER

3 EDUCATION

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1. INTRODUCTION

Access to quality education remains a sticking point for the many Syrian refugee children and youth in the region. Turkey hosts the largest share of this population, with more than 1 million school-aged-children,[1] nearly all of whom reside outside camps. Jordan hosts some 232,000 school-aged Syrians,[2] with most living in Amman and the northern governorates. In Iraq, where nearly all Syrians live in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), 61 percent live in urban areas while the rest are in camps; the overall population includes more than 68,800 school-aged children.[3] In Lebanon, where Syrians live among host communities, there were some 488,000 Syrian school-aged children as of 2018.[4]

Across the Middle East, education policies have overall been inclusive of refugee students. Since 2014, for instance, the Lebanese Ministry of Education and Higher Education has supported the integration of Syrian refugees into formal and informal schooling through its Reaching All Children with Education in Lebanon (RACE I, 2014–16) and RACE II programs (2017–21).[5] In Jordan, the government adopted an Education Strategic Plan (2018–22) that seeks to improve access to and quality of education for both Jordanian and refugee children.[6] In Turkey, all children under temporary protection have the right to be registered in public schools for the purpose of basic education.[7] And in Iraq, child refugees and asylum seekers with legal residency can enroll in public primary and secondary schools for free and can also access informal learning programs including technical vocational trainings, "catch-up" classes, and early childhood development programs.[8]

Box 1. About this project

This chapter is part of a research project by the Durable Solutions Platform (DSP) and the Migration Policy Institute (MPI), titled «A Bridge To Firmer Ground: Learning from International Experiences to Support Pathways to Solutions in the Syrian Refugee Context». As the protracted Syrian refugee crisis continues and refugee communities, host governments, and international donors and implementers attempt to move toward durable solutions, this project analyzes projects, policies, and approaches from around the world and draws lessons learned for the Syrian context. This report provides recommendations for host-country policymakers, regional and international bodies, and nongovernmental actors.

The other chapters of this research report are available here.

Despite these inclusive policies, major obstacles continue to limit access to education among Syrian children, and as many as 800,000 remain out of school across the four major Syrian refugee host countries studied.[9] The lack of adequate infrastructure is a main challenge, especially in regions where there were already not enough schools.[10] In KRI, for instance, some of the cities hosting refugees do not have sufficient classroom space.[11] In Turkey, schools already experienced limited resources and crowded classrooms before the arrival of large numbers of Syrians.[12] Host countries have also had to recruit and train more staff to accommodate the new student population. In Lebanon, the government established double shifts in schools, but previous analysis has shown that this often coincided with a decrease in students' learning time and an increase in teaching staff turnover.[13] Across the region, the arrival of refugees has sometimes led to further staff retention difficulties,[14] as teachers can become overworked and the situation has demanded more work in terms of lesson planning and managing the classroom.[15] Still, efforts have been deployed to train teachers on how to better include refugees (and limit bullying[16]) and implement learner-centered approaches.[17]

Limits to refugee education are also linked to the economic difficulties faced by refugee households and challenges of meeting administrative requirements in host countries. For example, a 2019 study found that Syrian refugee families in Jordan increasingly had to rely on child labor in agriculture to meet their needs.[18] Similar issues were recorded in Lebanon, KRI, and Turkey, where many refugee children have had to work to support their families and, as a result, do not attend school.[19] As part of an effort to overcome economic hardship, some families have also resorted to child marriage; a 2014 report estimated that the rate of child marriage among Syrian refugees in Jordan increased from 18 percent in 2012 to 32 percent in the first quarter of 2014 (against less than 13 percent in Syria before the war).[20] Another main obstacle is that many families lack the documentation needed to

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register their children in schools, either a government-endorsed certificate for students or a service card issued by the ministry of interior or a placement test (as in Jordan[21]), or official identification and certification of past studies (as in Lebanon and Turkey).[22] Even when cumbersome administrative requirements are lifted, this is not always applied in the same way everywhere, in some cases for lack of awareness among school principals.[23] Finally, Syrian children may be reluctant to attend school if they experience violence and bullying, and discrimination against refugee students has been widely reported across the region.[24]

None of these challenges are restricted to primary education, and many Syrian students do not have the opportunity to attend secondary and higher education. In 2015, there were an estimated 450,000 university-aged Syrian refugees (worldwide), and in 2016, of the 150,000 Syrians thought to be eligible for admission into higher education, less than 6 percent were believed to be enrolled.[25] The main obstacles to higher education are the associated fees and the limited or uneven recognition of credits and past certificates. For instance, Syrian refugees living in Jordan have to pay the same fees as foreign students, which is likely to dissuade some from studying. In comparison, in Turkey, students can benefit from free tuitions fees for state universities, and they can apply for scholarships for private universities.[26] However, not all Turkish universities (or departments within these universities) have the same standards for recognizing credits obtained in Syria, which can be a major obstacle for some students.[27]

Many of these educational challenges are not specific to the Syrian context. Based on 2018 data, there are 7.1 million refugee school-aged children under the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) mandate and some 3.7 million are out of school.[28] In 2018, the Global Compact on Refugees emphasized the need to improve refugee inclusion in national education systems, while strengthening their resilience.[29] The Global Refugee Forum convened in December 2019 further highlighted these priorities. Out of the 285 financial pledges put forward, the largest number of commitments (69) were education focused.[30] The Refugee Compact also aligns with the 2030 Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals, specifically with Goal 4 to "ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all."[31]

Drawing on these international commitments and recent developments in the education field, this chapter presents lessons learned from policies and practices in other parts of the world, across three areas: how to design and implement inclusive education policies (Subsection 2); how to meet the specific needs of refugee students (3); and how to promote access to higher education for refugees (4).

2. DESIGNING AND IMPLEMENTING INCLUSIVE EDUCATION POLICIES

As recommended by the Global Compact on Refugees,[32] countries hosting refugees increasingly include refugee students in their national education system. However, host-country governments often face pressure on their education infrastructure when seeking to accommodate this new population. Lessons learned from the adoption and implementation of policies in Peru and Uganda provide insights that could benefit similar approaches in the Middle East.

PERU'S LIMA APRENDE

Country	Peru
Years active	Since February 2019, renewed on an annual basis
Key objectives	Expand access to basic education for all school-aged children in Lima regardless of nationality or legal status
Target population	14,000 school-aged children identified as being out of school in Lima (including both migrant/refugee and native-born children)
Budget	USD 5 million for the first-year implementation (MINEDU – Peru's Ministry of Education)[33]

CONTEXT AND DESIGN OF LIMA APRENDE

In Peru, the spike in arrivals of Venezuelan migrant and refugee children that began in 2016 has strained the capacity of the education system that, by law, guarantees all children full access to basic and secondary education.[34] Since 2016, more than 1 million Venezuelan migrants and refugees have moved to Peru,[35] making it the second largest host country for Venezuelans, after Colombia. Approximately 20 percent of Venezuelan migrants in Peru are children and adolescents under age 18, and the majority—almost two-thirds—have settled in the capital city of Lima and the nearby Callao province.

Prior to the Venezuelan crisis, some public schools in Lima and Callao were already struggling with overcrowded classrooms, and the arrival of this new student population has added to their difficulties.[36] In addition to the lack of available spots, Venezuelan migrant and refugee students have encountered challenges due to administrative issues (e.g., lack of proper documentation for enrollment, or arriving after the official enrollment period) and limited familiarity with the education system more broadly. These arrivals have also raised new challenges for principals and teachers navigating a multicultural learning environment for the first time and facing difficulties keeping up with registration, adequate instruction methods, and classroom cohesion. In late 2018, with encouragement from the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF),[37] the Peruvian Ministry of Education (MINEDU)began developing a suitable response and an action plan for 2019.[38]

Box 2. Lima Aprende

In February 2019, the MINEDU conducted a needs assessment and drafted an action plan that became known as Lima Aprende – "Lima Learns, Not a Child without Studying." This strategy aimed to address four key needs identified at the basic education level:

1. **Expand the capacity of public schools, in terms of infrastructure and human resources.** This entailed launching a ten-month school calendar (starting in June 2019, ending in February 2020) for early childhood, basic, and primary education, and creating 10,000 additional places in 94 public schools in Lima and Callao by establishing double shifts and activating unused spaces in these schools.

2. **Boost enrollment in early education, basic, and secondary education of both Venezuelan and Peruvian children who were out of school.** The authorities spearheaded an awareness campaign to reach families of children not attending school and encouraged them to enroll their children. To do this, they disseminated information on Lima Aprende, with the support of partners (including principals and teachers, nongovernmental organizations [NGOs], international organizations, and government agencies) and through different platforms and mediums.[39]

3. **Provide capacity building and professional development opportunities for principals and teaching staff.** MINEDU, with support from international organizations, conducted regular trainings and workshops for educators to learn about immigration issues, provide guidance on how to implement new government regulations related to enrollment procedures for foreign-born students, and strategies to provide academic and emotional support in a multicultural environment.

4. **Foster social cohesion and prevent xenophobia and discrimination in the classrooms.** The strategy also included ten mobile support groups composed of four members: two psychologists, one instructor, and one social worker to assist teachers and students with emotional and social support.

One year after its implementation, Lima Aprende yielded some positive results, while also facing some limitations. Of the 10,000 additional school places created,[40] 6,000 were filled by new students who had not previously been in school but 4,000 remained vacant due to limitations in the enrollment strategy.[41] About 50 percent of the program's beneficiaries were Venezuelan, and the other 50 percent were Peruvian children.[42] Notably, per official estimates, 50 percent of all Venezuelan children in Peru remain out of school.[43] The mobile support groups were able to work in 120 schools at all three levels (early childhood, primary, and secondary education),[44] and more than 147 principals and teachers participated in the trainings and workshops.[45]

One of Lima Aprende's main shortcoming so far has been the enrollment strategy. Interviewees with senior officials highlighted the need to adopt a more targeted approach to target immigrant and refugee children who do not have access to information or are unfamiliar on how to obtain school placement or register for school.[46] First, the lack of a centralized system and/or online platform for enrollment in public schools remains a barrier, as prior to COVID-19, people needed to go in person to schools to complete the process. Moreover, this was the first time in Peru's history when a school year launched with a new starting date, which made recruitment efforts more challenging among non-immigrant communities used to the old schedule.

MINEDU decided to relaunch the strategy for 2020. For that year, it created 16,000 vacancies in 300 new schools and managed to fill 15,300 of them.[47] At the moment, however, budget constraints,[48] changes in leadership inside MINEDU, and the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic have reduced the ability of the initiative to continue adding school capacity, as the ministry temporarily halted training and workshops, as well as the mobile support groups. It remains to be seen how the strategy will evolve for 2021, as it is plausible that pandemic-related social-distancing and lockdown measures will remain in place.

LESSONS LEARNED AND APPLICABILITY FOR THE SYRIAN CONTEXT

1 CONDUCT JOINT NEEDS ASSESSMENT TO MAP OUT GAPS IN EDUCATION SERVICES FOR REFUGEES AND HOST COMMUNITIES TO INFORM POLICY DESIGN

- It is important to include all students in the initial needs assessment, regardless of nativity, to get a complete picture of educational access and quality issues.

- Investments in data management are often needed to overcome the lack of data interoperability.

- A mix of quantitative and qualitative data can help map out what the relevant issues are and how to address them.

Lima Aprende offers key lessons on how to leverage rigorous data collection and analysis to design an effective policy intervention. In Peru, initial data collection efforts conducted with the support of by international organizations provided preliminary estimates of the number of Venezuelan migrant and refugee children who were out of school. However, in November 2018, the government and UNICEF decided to join forces to conduct a more comprehensive assessment. To do so, they tapped into all existent data from government databases. They also conducted a census of 500 schools in Lima and Callao to identify their main needs. This survey provided more in-depth information about the socioemotional challenges that principals, teachers, as well as students were facing in schools.[49] Meanwhile, the data available in the Ministry of Education's *Sistema de Informaciòn de Apoyo a la Gestiòn de la Instituciòn Educativa* (SIAGIE, the information system supporting the management of educational institutions) and the interoperability of Peru's Migration Information Registry (RIM) were key for identifying the number of native- and foreign-born children who were out of school, the schools operating over capacity, and the districts around Lima that required infrastructure investment to accommodate new students.[50] Thus, the use of both quantitative and qualitative data collection methodologies was essential for the design of a response plan that matched the needs of the actors involved in a comprehensive way. The financial and technical support of international organizations and the collaboration between government departments were critical to conducting the census and data analysis that led to the inception of Lima Aprende.[51]

In the Syrian context, the absence of thorough assessments due to insufficient data gathering mechanisms, the lack of disaggregated data, and limited information-sharing have at times hindered the formulation of evidence-based policies and effective decision-making processes.[52] For instance, Jordan's Education Management Information System, which the government uses to track education data, including on school capacity, lacks sufficient information, is infrequently updated, and is not linked to other major data sources.[53] As Lima Aprende shows, robust data collection methods and strong technical intergovernmental collaboration are key elements for effective policy design.

2   PROMOTE MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE WHEN IMPLEMENTING POLICIES

- Effective implementation often needs high-level leadership within the government, which can be accomplished through the appointment of a general manager reporting directly at political level.

- It is essential to ensure coordination at national and local levels, at all stages of the policy design and implementation. Cross-department cooperation can be enhanced through a working group.

- Direct engagement with local authorities, school principals, and teachers is vital to making sure they are able to receive the support available.

Lima Aprende demonstrates the importance of having leadership at the highest level to help realize policy interventions, secure buy-in among stakeholders, and foster strong coordination and cooperation among them. In Peru, the MINEDU Vice Minister of Institutional Management at the time played a critical role in setting into motion the working group that developed Lima Aprende.[54] He also assigned a general manager for this working group, who would report progress directly to him.[55]

In addition to the leadership within MINEDU, strong coordination and cooperation among members of MINEDU's working group and international organizations were key to Lima Aprende's design and implementation. Policymakers and representatives from international organizations held regular meetings with each other and with other critical stakeholders, including representatives of all seven of Lima's local education management units.[56] The objective of these meetings was to incorporate their feedback into the design and rollout of the strategy, to assign clear roles for its implementation and outreach, and to exchange information to coordinate the stakeholders' agendas. Principals, school administrators, and teachers were also included in these meetings. As the main implementers, it was crucial to ensure their buy-in. And given that they would be the main beneficiaries of technical assistance and much-needed human and financial resources, they were very receptive to the strategy.[57]

Some of the shortcomings of previous policy interventions in the major host countries for Syrian refugees have been the top-bottom approach to their design and implementation. These interventions have been highly dependent on external funding, leadership, and guidance from international donors. At times, this has led to disagreements among national authorities and international donors over how resources should be allocated, and when faced with budget shortfalls and implementations challenges, it has been difficult to identify bottlenecks and the single government actor responsible for the pitfalls.[58] Lima Aprende showcases how some of these challenges can be overcome: ensuring there is high-level government leadership as well as government ownership of the process, internal follow-up, role clarity among stakeholders, as well as constant coordination and cooperation at all phases of the policy intervention.

3   IMPROVE THE RESILIENCE OF THE EDUCATION SYSTEM, IN THE SHORT AND LONGER TERM

- Some temporary measures can help cope with immediate pressure (e.g., double shifts schools), but authorities need to move toward more sustainable practices in the medium and longer term.

In the Syrian context, some governments have developed targeted approaches to address the education needs of refugee populations. Examples include Temporary Education Centers (TECs) in Turkey[59], or the Accelerated Learning Program in Lebanon[60] or double-shift schools in Lebanon, Jordan[61] and Turkey.[62] While these targeted approaches have been necessary to meet immediate needs, they have shown limitations in terms of the long-term integration of refugees into host communities, as they have tended to segregate newcomer students from their local peers and can hamper their ability to learn the local language (in the case of Turkey).[63]

In addition, interventions specifically designed for refugees have sometimes been perceived by local communities as prioritizing the needs of refugees over those of other residents, leading to retaliation and exacerbating social tensions.[64] In comparison, the Peruvian government's approach in Lima Aprende focused on designing a more flexible and inclusive system by opening afternoon shifts and enrollment for the new calendar year, to the benefit of both Peruvian and Venezuelan children (and acknowledging that this was a temporary measure). This integrated strategy resulted in the positive reception of the initiative by local constituencies, and it was key for strengthening cohesion between the migrant and refugee population and the local community.[65]

UGANDA'S EDUCATION RESPONSE PLAN (ERP)

Country	Uganda
Years active	2018–2021
Key objectives	Enhance access to education through material support (building new schools, distributing learning materials) and improve the quality of education services (training of teachers, improved learning methods) for refugees and host communities in 12 refugee-hosting districts
Target population	567,500 students per school year, including 435,344 refugees and 131,316 Ugandan children[66]
Budget	USD 389 million (but not fully financed)[67]

CONTEXT AND DESIGN OF THE ERP

Uganda is Africa's largest refugee-hosting country, with approximately 1.4 million refugees as of 2020, of whom more than 60 percent are children under the age of 18.[68] A large part of this population arrived in Uganda after 2016, when the country received large-scale refugee arrivals from South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Burundi. Even prior to these arrivals, Uganda did not have enough classrooms or teachers for its school-age population.[69] As of 2018, 57 percent of refugee children in Uganda (around 353,000 children) and 34 percent of local children in refugee-hosting districts (around 171,000) did not have access to education.[70]

Starting in 2016, a combination of international and national policy developments drove attention and funding to Uganda's education system. In 2016, the World Humanitarian Summit established a global fund for education in emergency situations, called Education Cannot Wait, and selected Uganda as a priority country. Uganda subsequently received funding to provide education for marginalized children, including refugees. At the national level, the Ugandan government embraced the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) in 2017, acknowledging the principle of inclusive and coordinated education service delivery.[71] In the same year, Kampala developed the Education Sector Strategic Plan (ESSP) for 2017–20, to guide its response to the refugee crisis and the provision of quality education to refugees and host communities.[72] Subsequently, in 2018, the government drafted the Education Response Plan (ERP) to operationalize the ESSP and the CRRF.

Box 3. What Is the Education Response Plan?

The ERP was designed to alleviate the pressure on Uganda's education system while still expanding access to education and improving the quality of instruction for children and youth (ages 3–24) within refugee and host communities in 12 priority districts across Uganda.[73] The Ministry of Education and Sports (MoES) conducted an initial needs assessment and started outlining activities and pilots to improve teaching and learning in 34 refugee-hosting counties. These activities included recruiting and training teachers, providing instructional materials, developing capacity for teacher supervision, and improving coordination of donors and implementing partners under the ERP. The plan also envisioned a real-time learning component to adapt activities to new needs over the course of the program.[74]

The ERP is primarily implemented by the Government of Uganda, with strong coordination between national and local authorities—facilitated by decentralized planning—and partnerships with international actors. On the ground, UN agencies, international and local NGOs, as well as private providers and government bodies all participate in the delivery of the ERP, while cooperating with local authorities. Refugees and host communities have also been included as key stakeholders in implementation, and the ERP has made it possible to accredit refugee teachers, among other things.[75]

Two years after the launch of the ERP, UNHCR and the MoES have already reported early signs of its impact on Uganda's education system. When the ERP started, only 43 percent of school-aged refugees were in school in Uganda, but one year later, this share increased to 56.5 percent (with about 90,000 more refugee children in school).[76] Improvements in primary education have been particularly rapid, with school enrollment increasing from 58 percent to 73 percent between 2018 and 2019 (exceeding the 65 percent enrollment target). Enrollment in secondary education also rose, though more modestly (from 11 percent to 15 percent). While it is not possible to precisely identify the extent to which each of the ERP's activities has contributed to these improvements at this stage, initial evaluations of the ERP and interviews with UNHCR and MoES representatives suggest that the program has achieved some quick gains in a short time, particularly in the areas of institutional development, coordination, and data management.[77]

Progress under the ERP can be attributed to several factors, including a favorable policy environment (via the ESSP, the inter-sectoral Steering Committee of the Education Response Plan Secretariat and the CRRF) in Uganda and a high level of commitment from a wide range of development and humanitarian partners within the Education in Emergency Response (e.g., the World Bank, African Development Bank, UNICEF, UNHCR) as well as donors (e.g., Education Cannot Wait, the EU Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations [DG ECHO]) who have helped to secure funding, provide technical support and roll out activities under the ERP.[78] But the program is not without its challenges. The ERP has had limited success in helping students transition to secondary schools, mainly due to the relative lack of secondary schools near refugee settlements, but also because attending secondary school is not compulsory in Uganda—meaning that both opportunities and incentives for enrollment are weak.[79] Moreover, the impact of the ERP on education outcomes remains a blind spot, as current monitoring activities and progress reports focus mainly on outputs of program activities rather than capturing the effects on school attendance and learning of refugees. Therefore, it remains to be seen the extent to which and how the ERP will have fulfilled its main promises by the end of 2021.

LESSONS LEARNED AND APPLICABILITY FOR THE SYRIAN CONTEXT

1 **ADDRESS ACCESS ISSUES TO EDUCATION THROUGH TARGETED INVESTMENTS**

- Accelerated Education Programming can be useful to help refugee children who have dropped out of school re-enter the education system.

- Access to education should be facilitated for learners with special needs (e.g., through assistive devices and specialised teaching methods).

- Remote learning technologies can facilitate educational access in remote regions, but connectivity issues—if unaddressed—may limit their impact.

To mitigate crowdedness in Ugandan schools, the government first decided to construct new schools, building 530 within the first year of the ERP.[80] Other measures have been deployed to help children access schooling. The ERP has supported the use of Accelerated Education Programming (AEP), which condenses the seven-year primary education cycle into three levels.[81] Despite ongoing challenges, including teacher remuneration, language barriers, and student retention issues, the AEP curriculum has provided disadvantaged, older, and out-of-school children with access to primary education.[82] As of 2019, 618 teachers had been trained in the AEP curriculum and more than 22,000 students had received instruction.[83] It also offers children an avenue to higher education by preparing them to sit the Primary Leavers' Exam and obtain a nationally recognized school certificate.[84] In addition to the AEP, the ERP has promoted the use of assistive devices (such as hearing aids) and trained teachers to support children with special needs, in furtherance of the aim to make the school environment more accessible and suited to students with disabilities (12 percent of all learners in Uganda).[85]

Finally, the ERP includes a component on distance learning through technological innovations to address barriers to education, such as the long distance some students (particularly in remote areas) must travel to schools and the prevalence and fear of gender-based violence in or on the way to schools, which discourages some learners (especially girls) from enrolling.[86] COVID-19 brought this component into even sharper focus, with the ERP Secretariat and the MoES providing distance learning support as part of its COVID-19 response to allow students to remain connected to their schools.[87] Specifically, this has included guidance for teachers on how to develop and deliver radio and television lessons for learners (both via radio and SD cards), and for parents on their roles and responsibilities in ensuring that learning continues at home.[88] However, this sudden shift to remote learning has brought challenges for households who do not have access to radio, TV sets, or home-schooling materials, and for children who have to spend more time supporting their families with work at home.[89] To mitigate this issue, the Education Cannot Wait fund allocated USD 1 million in emergency funding to ERP partners; this was used, for example, to distribute 38,000 home learning kits and more than 900 solar-powered radios to the poorest refugee and host-community households.[90] Altogether, these lessons from the ERP could be useful to increase enrollment in other countries where refugee children have dropped out of school and in places, such as Jordan and Lebanon, where as many as 30 percent of Syrian refugee students report having special needs.[91]

2 — ADDRESS ACCESS ISSUES TO EDUCATION THROUGH TARGETED INVESTMENTS

- Under certain conditions, refugee teachers can help address gaps in staffing.
- Training teachers on medical and protection referral pathways can help improve the delivery of services to refugees, as well as the broader communities in which they live.

In Uganda, a main challenge has been attracting and retaining teachers in remote areas, including in regions hosting a large number of refugees. For example, in 2019, one refugee-hosting district reported that only 30 percent of its teaching staff would regularly come to work at the schools.[92] Despite these issues, the government has made strides in increasing the number of teachers, with 936 new hires between 2018 and 2019.[93] The authorities have also sought to register, license, and train more refugee teachers to increase the student-to-teacher ratio.[94] But a study by the UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and DG ECHO has shown that employing refugee teachers in Uganda could be challenging, in particular due to difficulties some may face in adjusting to the Uganda curriculum and different salary expectations.[95]

In addition to increasing the number of teachers, the Ugandan government and its partners have delivered training for teachers in refugee-hosting districts, including on positive classroom management techniques and medical and protection referral pathways.[96] As of September 2020, 283 teachers (14 percent of the overall target population) had received training, but the extent to which this has affected the quality of teaching and student support remains to be assessed.[97] Sensitizing teachers to forced displacement issues remains a challenge in the Syrian displacement context; for example, teachers are not always familiar with the constraints faced by refugee students, who may need to skip classes to work in order to support their families. In cases where teachers apply strict attendance criteria, as reported in Lebanon and Jordan,[98] refugee students can be at higher risk of dropping out.

3 — DESIGN EFFECTIVE MONITORING SYSTEMS TO TRACK PROGRAM PROGRESS

- Better monitoring, with the support of UN agencies and other partners and the use of new technologies, is critical to identify lessons learned.
- The data collected through monitoring can help efforts to advocate for policies and programs to increase refugees' long-term access to all levels of education services.

To monitor progress and promote real-time learning throughout implementation, the ERP teams have planned to build monitoring capacity at both the district and national level. Looking ahead, the program plans to train local authorities on how to use technology to engage in more frequent, digital feedback loops, as opposed to traditional, paper-based reporting.[99] This would add to efforts by other actors, including UN agencies, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, as well as NGOs, that already support monitoring and evaluation efforts through research on the effects of refugees' presence on Uganda's education system.[100] If implemented successfully, this pillar of the ERP could help develop a monitoring and evaluation culture, enabling educational services to continually improve and making it possible to hold donors, implementing partners, and national and local authorities accountable. The data collected can also strengthen efforts to advocate for certain policies or programs by demonstrating their effectiveness or promise to the government and its partners, to request international funding, and to design policies that are even more inclusive for refugees.[101]

At present, however, monitoring activities are largely focused on outputs (e.g., enrollment rates, number of teachers trained, schools built, wash facilities installed), with a recent ERP progress report

flagging the inadequate measurement of quality and learning outcomes as one of three key issues facing the program.[102] Current indicators also need to be adjusted to reflect the COVID-19 context; for example, rather than focusing on assessing improvements in school infrastructure, it may be more appropriate to measure learning outcomes at home. These challenges are present in the Syrian displacement context as well, where studies have highlighted that the quality of education and education outcomes are often not adequately monitored, pointing to gaps in the capacity of Education Management Information Systems and recommending further investments in data collection on learning outcomes.[103] A major good practice used in the ERP has been the mapping out of policy targets early on, with a disaggregated results framework directly included in the plan.[104]

Recommendations

National governments:
- Ensure clear leadership and reporting structure to implement education policies, and where necessary set up adapted governance systems to do so.
- Invest in teacher recruitment, retention and training and capacities to ensure school staff are well prepared to work with refugee students.
- Work with partners to collect education data from multiple sources and move towards an inter-operable system for this data, while ensuring data protection principles are enforced.

Civil-society organizations:
- Support efforts by authorities and donors to monitor the effects of inclusive education policies, including through innovative modalities.

Donors:
- Provide long-term financial and technical assistance to host countries seeking to improve refugee inclusion in their education systems, to support the strengthening of education infrastructure as well as teaching staff and broader school administrative teams.
- Pilot innovative tools, such as remote-learning technologies, and provide resources to scale them up if proven effective and relevant.

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3. ANSWERING THE SPECIFIC EDUCATIONAL NEEDS OF REFUGEE STUDENTS

Despite Syrian host countries having inclusive education systems and granting refugees access to formal education, Syrian students are likely to face difficulties catching up with their peers due to linguistic, curricular, and social differences as well as to the negative impacts of forced displacement. Targeted interventions such as out-of-school-hours learning support programs, which are already highly prevalent in responses to Syrian displacement, can help address some of these difficulties, even though they need to be deployed in close coordination with other programs and the broader education system. While the Australian Learning Beyond the Bell program operates in an environment that is very different from those in the countries that host most Syrian refugees, its decentralized, community-specific model could be replicated and even adapted to include students from host communities, which could further promote both refugees' social inclusion and general educational improvement in the Middle East.

AUSTRALIA'S OUT-OF-SCHOOL-HOURS LEARNING SUPPORT PROGRAM: LEARNING BEYOND THE BELL

Country	Victoria, Australia
Years active	Since 2008
Key objectives	Provide extra support to students who have significant levels of disadvantage, including refugees, to improve their learning outcomes and inclusion in their school community
Target population	On average, up to 8,000 students each year, primarily refugees and migrants[105]
Budget	Budgetary needs differ from project to project. Learning Beyond the Bell (LBB) relies on various funding streams, including from the Government of Victoria Department of Education and Training, as well as a partnership with the Australian Communities Foundation, which provides up to AUD 20,000 for LBB-affiliated Out-of-School-Hours Learning Support Programs (USD 14,000). These OSHLSPs typically apply for grants ranging from AUD 15,000 to 40,000 (USD 10,000 to 28,000).[106]

CONTEXT AND DESIGN OF THE PROJECT

Australia resettles several thousand refugees each year,[107] many of whom face challenges establishing themselves and integrating into local communities. In addition to difficulties stemming from limited English proficiency, young refugees may encounter other challenges accessing education, including trouble transitioning into formal education following extended gaps in their schooling, being placed in inappropriate class levels based on their age rather than their educational attainment, and insufficient support from family as they process their resettlement experience and transition into a new learning environment.[108] Out-of-school-hours learning support programs (OSHLSPs) are a type of intervention that seeks to address these difficulties. Activities typically range from extracurricular activities such as sports, music, and clubs, to more academic and personal-development-focused tutoring, mentorship, and homework support.[109] They provide opportunities for students to build leadership and social skills outside the formal classroom setting. In refugee contexts, OSHLSPs help children bridge educational gaps and adjust to their new educational environment.[110] These initiatives tend to be well established in high-income countries such as Australia,[111] but they are less common in low- and middle-income countries, where resources are often strained.[112]

In Australia, OSHLSPs serving the state of Victoria's diverse population of refugees and migrants have operated since the early 2000s.[113] Studies in 2007 found these programs provided substantial benefits for participating children, including building confidence, improving learning outcomes, and developing communication skills.[114] However, these interventions remained fragmented and uncoordinated, and they fell short of a clear exit strategy for when these projects come to an end.[115] Programs often relied on untrained volunteers and were not always designed to meet the needs of

refugees.[116] Based on these findings, in 2008, a Victoria-based NGO, the Centre for Multicultural Youth,[117] developed and launched a new initiative, Learning Beyond the Bell (LBB).[118]


Box 4. Learning Beyond the Bell

LBB operates as a network of more than 350 out-of-school-hours learning support programs throughout Victoria, with the Centre for Multicultural Youth providing centralized support.[119] The actual OSHLSPs are run by NGOs, community organizations, and schools, each with its own operational characteristics and targeted to meet the specific needs of local refugee and migrant communities.[120] Initiatives run by or in coordination with schools sometimes have class coordinators, who help align OSHLSP activities with the material covered in school. Some OSHLSPs also involve parents and broader refugee and migrant communities.[121]

Projects are predominantly staffed by volunteers and the Centre for Multicultural Youth plays a coordinating and supporting role in LBB's operations. The organization helps those interested in LBB to conduct needs assessments and design project activities. They also deliver trainings and provide e-learning modules, including logistics and child safety trainings, courses on the specific challenges facing refugee learners, and resources to help newly arrived families navigate the educational system.[122] Finally, the Centre for Multicultural Youth connects OSHLSPs with funding and other support, maintaining lists of relevant specialized partners,[123] and they liaise with the Government of Victoria.

In the 12 years since its creation, LBB has helped address some of the education-related challenges facing Victoria's refugee and migrant children, reaching more than 11,000 students.[124] Using case study analysis and surveys of project stakeholders throughout LBB's implementation (a comprehensive impact assessment has not yet been conducted), the Centre for Multicultural Youth found that LBB has boosted refugee and migrant academic confidence and progress, created social connections and increased social confidence, improved English language abilities, and engaged parents in their children's academic community.[125]

LESSONS LEARNED AND APPLICABILITY FOR THE SYRIAN CONTEXT

1 UNDERSTAND AND INVOLVE TARGETED COMMUNITIES IN PROGRAM DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION

- Decentralized OSHLSPs should be adapted to conduct rigorous needs assessments at start-up and to regularly update their approach to address issues as they arise.
- Consulting directly with beneficiaries allows for greater community buy-in and support.
- The involvement of local volunteers can help promote social cohesion.

OSHLSPs are most successful when the needs of the target beneficiaries are clearly identified, and when the program is designed based on this information and with considerable flexibility. Because Victoria's refugee and migrant population is diverse and its characteristics change over time, the decentralized structure of LBB is particularly well suited to respond to evolving issues. Not only can new programs address the specific needs of new communities, the close relationship, regular consultation, and coordination between program leaders and targeted communities mean existing programs can shift and add new programmatic elements based on feedback.[126] This can include, for example, adding a physical activity component or placing additional focus on family engagement.[127]

Consultation can take many forms, such as individual conversations with community leaders and key entities (schools, migrant resource centers, etc.); surveys and focus groups; and, most importantly, regular discussions with students and their families.[128] These consultations not only allow for better targeting, but also give the community a stake in the program's success.[129] In the Syrian refugee context, this would entail tailoring interventions for specific refugee and host communities based on shared experiences and needs. This could be especially valuable for refugee communities living outside of camps, whose circumstances and needs are more diverse and who face specific challenges integrating into national schools. Program design and implementation should be adapted based on continued feedback and consultation.

LBB-affiliated OSHLSPs, through their reliance on volunteers, also offer local communities the opportunity to get to know their refugee neighbors and become part of the integration process. Volunteers can help create intergenerational and intercommunal friendships and support structures, while peer tutoring can build relationships between students closer in age; both types of connections improve integration outcomes.[130] For this to succeed, programs require dedicated, qualified volunteers who receive adequate training and oversight. The recruitment and training process can benefit from partnerships with local institutions, such as universities, and sustained engagement can help the program succeed long term.[131] In the Syrian refugee context, using local volunteers could help improve social cohesion, especially if the volunteers see a benefit from the program as well. This could include specific benefits, such as opportunities to receive specialized training, and more general ones, such as additional support and space for community activities.

2 EFFECTIVELY IMPLEMENT AND COORDINATE A DECENTRALIZED MODEL

- Decentralized projects require an umbrella or lead organization to coordinate and oversee them, as well as to provide assistance when required.

- OSHLSPs require strong leadership and solid organizational structures to be sustainable.

LBB succeeds in part because of the Centre for Multicultural Youth's coordination and support role, as well as its help ensuring that groups starting and running projects are aware of potential operational and organizational challenges and partnering interested schools with those organizations most qualified to assist. In the Syrian refugee context, previous attempts at informal[132] education for refugees in Jordan, for example, have lacked the effective coordination and long-term funding necessary to operate sustainably.[133] As such, a coordinating organization or consortium at the national, regional, or local level could ensure that the implementing partners, including grassroots organizations that may be interested in participating, are not overlapping targeted communities, are similarly trained, and have access to common resources.

Even with effective coordination, LBB relies on its network of implementing organizations (NGOs, community organizations, and schools), which means its interventions succeed or fail based on the strengths and weaknesses of these partners. Organizations with strong leadership and experience in managing projects are most successful at running OSHLSPs long term. Other groups, such as those formed specifically to implement OSHLSPs, may succeed in the short term, especially with strong leaders; however, this strength often peters out and the program dissipates over time. In the Syrian refugee context, numerous organizations have experience with refugee education; they could leverage this project management experience and other operational strengths to successfully implement their own OSHLSPs. However, newer grassroots organizations may require more oversight and support to build their implementation capacity, a role that could be filled by a coordinating entity.

3 ENSURE COMPLEMENTARITY WITH BROADER REFUGEE EDUCATION PROGRAMMING

- OSHLSPs can only achieve their objectives if they are designed and implemented in ways that complement other educational initiatives.
- These targeted interventions need to be connected with broader education policies, at both the local and national level.

While LBB itself has had positive impacts on its targeted communities, it is only one component within a larger refugee education strategy. In addition to Australia's English language support programs, Victoria has government-supported interventions including an intensive capacity-building program targeting schools with large numbers of refugees;[134] activities to support schools in addressing refugee trauma;[135] and initiatives such as giving schools access to interpretation services and multicultural education advisors.[136] Since LBB builds on formal refugee education, it relies on this comprehensive approach to maximize its impact.

Similarly, in the Syrian context, extracurricular activities and OSHLSPs cannot overcome the extensive obstacles refugees face to equitably and effectively accessing formal education if they act as standalone interventions.[137] These barriers include an insufficient number of teachers given the number of students, inadequate building space, documentation requirements, social stigma and bullying, and widespread poverty that can lead refugee children to work instead of attending school. Without addressing these broader issues—or supporting other interventions and policies that are working to do so—OSHLSPs will not be fully effective.

Recommendations

National and local governments should:

- Integrate out-of-school-hours learning support programs into broader education policies and strategic planning and build adequate referral systems to connect learners to them.
- Consider out-of-school-hours learning support programs and other volunteer-based programs to help strengthen social cohesion between refugee and host communities.

Implementing partners (incl. civil-society organizations) should:

- Ensure that displacement-related effects on children's education and related challenges are specifically accounted for, especially when conducting needs assessments.
- Build coordination and consultation with local communities into program design to ensure consistent and continuing stakeholder buy-in and feedback.
- At the local and regional levels, map out and coordinate with other projects that have similar objectives to share best practices and learning and maximize impact.
- Work with grassroots and community organizations to build their capacity to sustainably implement out-of-school-hours learning support programs.

Donors should:

- In addition to supporting host-country governments in designing and implementing inclusive education policies, fund activities specifically designed to help refugee students overcome the specific challenges they face, including targeted out-of-school-hours learning support programs.

By: Tolga Sezgin

4. HIGHER EDUCATION AND VOCATIONAL TRAINING

In refugee contexts, the focus of educational interventions is often on primary education. Promoting access to higher education can be more difficult as it tends to be directly linked to granting refugees access to the formal labor market, and in many countries that host large numbers of refugees, youth unemployment is already high, and this question is sensitive. The European Union has funded a series of projects in the region, from Higher and Further Education Opportunities and Perspectives for Syrians (HOPES) to HOPES-Lebanon (HOPES-LEB), SPARK, and Higher Education and Vocational Training Program for Vulnerable Syrian and Jordanian Youth (EDU-SYRIA II) as part of the EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis (MADAD). Examination of these initiatives shows how different approaches can deliver on these objectives and what the trade-offs are of each approach.

FOUR EU PROJECTS: HOPES, HOPES-LEB, SPARK, EDU-SYRIA II

Countries	Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Egypt, and Iraq
Years active	HOPES: 2016–20 HOPES-LEB, in Lebanon: 2020–23 SPARK, in Turkey: 2019–24 EDU-SYRIA II, in Jordan: 2019–24
Key objectives	These projects aim to increase participation in further and higher education among Syrian youth as well as host-community members[138]
Target population	Syrian refugees of postsecondary-age as well as young people in host communities affected by the presence of refugees
Budget	HOPES: EUR 12 million HOPES-LEB: EUR 8.4 million SPARK: EUR 10 million EDU-SYRIA II: EUR 2.6 million These four interventions are funded by MADAD.

CONTEXT AND DESIGN OF THE PROJECTS

Prior to the war, 20 percent of Syrians ages 18 to 24 participated in higher education, but many have had to leave the country and interrupt their studies.[139] Often, they have not resumed their studies in their host countries,[140] due to a series of obstacles including the lack of necessary documentation for university admission, language barriers, and the costs of higher education. Limited access to higher education has had a knock-on effect on refugees' employability; this has exacerbated other challenges they face in seeking to access the formal labor market and compete for jobs in countries where youth unemployment is high.

Since 2014, MADAD has allocated nearly EUR 75 million in higher and further education[141] to enhance Syrian refugees' employability and their social and economic inclusion, in line with successive regional and country response plans to the Syrian crisis.[142] In 2016, MADAD launched the first phase of HOPES in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, and Iraq (as well as other projects implemented by the NGO SPARK, the German-Jordanian University [GJU], and UNHCR). The German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) together with three other EU Member State agencies (the British Council, Campus France, and Nuffic, the Dutch organization for internationalization in education)[143] led implementation.[144]

In the second phase of higher education programming, initiated in 2019, MADAD funded three projects: SPARK-Turkey, EDU-SYRIA II in Jordan, and HOPES-LEB in Lebanon (in 2020), respectively implemented by SPARK, the GJU, and DAAD. The objectives of these new projects are roughly similar to those of HOPES, and they all aim to increase access to higher education for Syrian refugees. They offer, however, an approach more tailored to each national context, including by targeting members of host communities more directly and linking higher education more systematically to labor market needs.

Box 5. What Are the Higher Education Projects under MADAD?

The first HOPES intervention was structured around five main components: (1) academic counselling, with education officers to help Syrian students and other youth in host communities access to higher education; (2) scholarships for students at the bachelor's or master's degree level, with a special focus on Syrians who had interrupted their studies; (3) English classes, including face-to-face and online courses; (4) funding for innovative educational offerings, such as credit-based short courses offered by local providers; and (5) stakeholder dialogues with higher education experts and actors (e.g., universities and ministries) in the region.[145]

The new projects funded by MADAD follow three different but complementary approaches:

- HOPES-LEB[146] constitutes a direct continuation of HOPES activities in Lebanon, mainly offering academic counselling and scholarships to Syrian and Lebanese students in partner universities (1,000) and funding institutional capacity development. This project, however, places more emphasis on the integration of vulnerable Lebanese students into higher education and the integration of graduates into the labor market.[147]

- SPARK-TURKEY[148] provides scholarships to 925 Syrian and Turkish students, as well as access to internship and job placement opportunities and tailored learning options (for Syrians). The initiative seeks to enhance social cohesion between these groups, as well as to increase their employability. Compared to the other interventions, this project puts an increased emphasis on access to vocational training, and it plans to train refugees for the potential needs of the labor market in Syria.

- EDU-SYRIA II[149] targets 180 Syrian and Jordanian students, with the aim of facilitating their access to higher education as well as vocational training (e.g., master's programs at the GJU, bachelor's program at Zarqa University).

The HOPES project was evaluated in 2018, indicating that 620 academic scholarships were granted to students at the bachelor's and master's levels, and for vocational training and similar diplomas.[150] HOPES also provided counselling to 26,333 students and funded 32 short-term education projects

that were implemented by local and regional institutions. In addition, it promoted institutional dialogue and networking by organizing two regional conferences in Beirut and Amman, plus 20 national stakeholder dialogues across the region. Finally, HOPES trained 283 teachers and built partnerships with 19 higher education institutions to deliver English courses to 8,514 students in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey. Two of the main limitations identified in the final evaluation of HOPES are that the number of beneficiaries was limited, compared to the scale of needs in the region, and that graduates rarely managed to secure durable employment.[151]

LESSONS LEARNED AND APPLICABILITY FOR THE SYRIAN CONTEXT

1 ADOPT AN INCLUSIVE APPROACH TO HIGHER EDUCATION BY TARGETING BOTH YOUNG SYRIAN REFUGEES AND HOST COMMUNITY MEMBERS

- As in primary education programming, including host communities as well as refugees in higher education programming can both boost inclusion and help secure long-term government support.

- Requires sustainable support from development actors and solid institutional relationships.

All MADAD interventions have targeted both Syrian refugees and host communities, with a renewed emphasis on host communities in the three most recent projects to answer the demand and needs of host governments for additional support in this area.[152] In Jordan, refugees and host communities both benefited from HOPES since the launch of the project was subject to a national rule whereby one-third of the budget had to directly benefit Jordanians.[153] In the other countries, DAAD and its partners opted for an inclusive approach from the beginning, for instance by sponsoring the same number of refugees and host-community students in Lebanon.[154] For this second wave of projects, MADAD insisted that more members of host communities should benefit from the activities, especially in host countries where youth were facing increasing difficulties accessing livelihoods and governments had become less welcoming of refugees and had requested additional support.[155]

2 RECOGNIZE THE NEED FOR A LOCALIZED APPROACH AND TRADE-OFFS IN SELECTING IMPLEMENTING PARTNERS

- Consideration for and careful navigation of sensitive political situations is key to getting and sustaining buy-in, as demonstrated by EU Member State agencies in HOPES and HOPES-LEB.

- Partnering with NGOs can allow for flexibility (as was the case with SPARK), while working with well-established institutions (such as the GJU in Jordan) can allow programs to build on a historical presence and broad networks.

In the first phase of HOPES, the EU Member State agencies could rely on long-standing relationships in the host countries. This proved particularly helpful in Turkey in the aftermath of the attempted coup in 2016, since DAAD and its partners were less vulnerable than NGOs to political pressure.[156] In countries such as Lebanon, the networks of HOPES partners made reaching agreements with local universities easier.[157] In addition, these agencies could rely on the support of their embassies to disentangle potential issues, and their association with several European governments facilitated the development of partnerships with universities in the European Union.[158] But as (mostly) public

agencies, HOPES partners have also proved less agile. By contrast, SPARK could deploy its activities faster and demonstrated more flexibility. It could also capitalize on the other projects it was already implementing in the region,[159] from relationships with key stakeholders to technical knowhow and needs analysis. As for the GJU, its main assets were well-oiled relationships with key stakeholders in Jordan, as well as an excellent understanding of the context and the challenges resulting from the Syrian crisis.[160] As such, the choice of partners for the second phase of programming reflects a more tailored assessment of the context and the operational challenges likely to arise in each country.

3 ENCOURAGE LINKAGES BETWEEN HIGHER EDUCATION AND LOCAL LABOR MARKETS, WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THE LIMITATIONS OF THIS APPROACH

- A stronger focus on local labor markets can be useful for the social and economic inclusion of young Syrian refugees.

- However, employment opportunities may be limited, at least in the short term, and the expectations of beneficiaries need to be managed.

In the three newer projects, EU donors and their implementing partners have emphasized the need to better connect investments in higher and further education with labor market needs. For example, HOPES-LEB plans to invest more resources in linking students with the private sector (e.g., e-commerce by providing students with a domain for free). On the flipside, job opportunities for youth are already limited in several of these countries. In Lebanon, the estimated youth unemployment rate was nearly 18 percent in 2020,[161] and in Jordan it was nearly 35 percent.[162] Refugees often face even greater difficulties, given their limited access to work permits and connections with potential employers. As such, while higher education interventions should match labor market needs, implementing partners must also manage the expectations of beneficiaries regarding the intrinsic limitations of local economies, particularly in light of the economic fallout of the global COVID-19 pandemic.

Recommendations

National governments:
- Adopt an inclusive approach to higher education that involves both refugees and host communities, as a highly skilled workforce will benefit the host country in the long term.
- Leverage international projects to promote cooperation between universities in the Middle East and European institutions.

Implementing partners:
- Adapt the engagement with host-country authorities to the situation and manage expectations among refugees about the opportunities available after graduation, given the restrictions on refugees' access to the formal job market.

Donors:
- Provide long-term financial support to higher education in host countries, so as to promote an inclusive higher education system.
- Select implementing partners based on the specific needs and characteristics of each context (for instance, the need for solid institutional support or the flexibility to adapt project design to quickly evolving needs).
- Integrate a stronger focus on labor market integration into higher education programming, while also investing in livelihood projects to promote job creation in target countries.

5. CONCLUSION

Access to education is essential to prevent refugee students from dropping out and never being able to catch up with their peers, particularly for those whose education has been interrupted by the sudden need to flee. Most host countries are ready to include refugee students in their primary education systems, but these countries often face difficulties upgrading their infrastructure and preventing the sudden influx of new students from negatively affecting the overall quality of the education system. As experiences in Peru and Uganda illustrate, donors and development actors have a critical role to play in assisting host governments in building additional schools (when needed) and recruiting and training more teaching staff. At the same time, refugee students often face difficulties due to their status or because their education was interrupted, they are unfamiliar with the national curriculum in the host country, or they encounter specific challenges (e.g., trauma, mental-health issues). Initiatives by civil-society actors, such as Learning Beyond the Bell, can help address these problems, support refugee integration into the school system, and promote greater social cohesion. Such initiatives are also relevant for refugees who wish to pursue higher education, many of whom also face difficulties integrating into the host-country university or vocational training system. A series of projects funded by MADAD have sought to facilitate access to further education for refugees (and host communities) through scholarships and counselling, as well as by building the capacity of higher education institutions in host countries. These interventions can, however, have mixed outcomes, as recent experiences have shown they do not always lead to refugees gaining formal employment, which may generate some frustrations among beneficiaries.

Main Recommendations

National and local governments:

- Spearhead the inclusion of refugees in the national education system, including provisions for improved infrastructure, staffing, and data collection and management.
- Encourage efforts to promote social cohesion between refugees and host-community members, including through efforts in the classrooms (e.g., training of teachers) and civil-society initiatives (e.g., after-school projects).
- Enable refugees who graduate from university or vocational training to access formal employment, with support from donors and implementing partners to create livelihood opportunities that benefit entire communities.

Implementing partners and civil-society actors:

- Support advocacy efforts to promote better inclusion of refugees in schools and higher education institutions.
- Contribute to monitoring and research efforts to assess the progress of inclusive educational policies and projects and to identify pending needs.

Donors:

- Commit to long-term support for host countries as they upgrade the capacity of their education systems, including higher education.
- Connect programming related to refugee education with broader education interventions in host countries.
- Acknowledge and fund targeted interventions for refugee students to address the specific difficulties they face.
- When supporting the inclusion of refugees in higher education projects, link these interventions with livelihoods projects to create more job opportunities that benefit refugees and host communities and, ultimately, to help overcome economic barriers to refugee education.

ENDNOTES

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2   Breanna Small, "I Want to Continue to Study": Barriers to Secondary Education for Syrian Refugee Children in Jordan (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2020).

3   UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Protection Monitoring of Refugees in Response to COVID-19 Round 3 (November-December 2020) (Iraq: UNHCR, 2020).

4   UNHCR, UNICEF, World Food Program (WFP), and Inter-Agency Coordination (IAC) Lebanon, Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon (Beirut: UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, and IAC Lebanon, 2018).

5   Lebanon Ministry of Education and Higher Education, "Reaching All Children with Education – Lebanon," accessed January 11, 2021.

6   Education for refugees falls under the category of "Basic and Secondary Education," and the Ministry of Education hopes to have all Syrian school-aged children enrolled in their appropriate level of schooling. See the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Ministry of Education, Education Strategic Plan 2018-2022 (Amman: Ministry of Education, 2018).

7   Public schools in Turkey are free of charge. Temporary protection beneficiaries also have the right to higher education. Education Vision 2023, the latest version of the national education strategy, which began in 2018, strongly emphasizes the need for data-based management and support for school administration. See UNHCR Turkey, "Education," accessed January 11, 2021; Turkey Ministry of National Education, Turkey's Education Vision 2023 (Ankara: Ministry of Education, 2019).

8   UNHCR Iraq, "Education," accessed January 11, 2021.

9   Government of Lebanon and United Nations, Education Sector Chapter – 2020 Update of the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (Beirut: Government of Lebanon and United Nations, 2020).

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11 Hashem Ahmadzadeh et al, Ensuring quality education for young refugees from Syria: Mapping exercise on quality education for young refugees from Syria (12-25 years) (Oxford: Refugee Studies Centre, 2014).

12 Melissa Hauber-Özer, Schooling gaps for Syrian refugees in Turkey (Oxford: Forced Migration Review, 2019).

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14 In Iraq, for example, the KRI Ministry of Education has not been able to pay refugee teacher incentives or provide textbooks and school supplies to Syrian refugee children. See Ministry of the Interior, The Education of Syrian Refugee Students in Kurdistan Region of Iraq.

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16 Ahmadzadeh et al, Ensuring quality education for young refugees from Syria.

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20 UNICEF, "Concern over child marriage among vulnerable girls in Jordan" (press release, July 16, 2014).

21 Jordanian regulations prohibit the re-enrollment of youth in school after three years of non-enrollment. The nature of the Syrian crisis means that many refugee children have now passed that cut-off point. In 2015, at least 60,000 Syrian children were unable to return to school because of these rules. See Reva Dhingra, "Worsening Gaps in Education for Syrian Refugees: Lessons from the Early Education Response in Jordan," Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy, January 9, 2019.

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25 Ning Luo and Ashley Craddock, The Refugee Crisis and Higher Education: Access Is One Issue. Credentials Are Another (New York: World Education News + Reviews, 2016).

26   In recent years, the number of Syrian students has nearly doubled, from 14,000 in 2016–17 to 33,000 in 2019–20. See Ahmet Barişçil, Refugee students in the Turkish higher education in the light of the Syrian conflict (Gödöllő, Hungary: Szent István University, 2019).

27   Basak Yavcan and Hana Addam El-Ghali, Higher Education and Syrian Refugee Students: The Case of Turkey: Policies, Practices, and Perspectives (Beirut: UNHCR, UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization [UNESCO], and the American University of Beirut Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs, 2017).

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29   The Global Compact aims to support host states by catalyzing both expertise and resources (aligned with national education laws and policies) to "expand and enhance the quality and inclusiveness of national education systems to facilitate access by refugee and host community children (both boys and girls), adolescents and youth to primary, secondary and tertiary education." Other key objectives include limiting the time refugees spend out of school to a maximum of three months post-arrival; investing in facilities, teachers, and innovative schooling modalities; and providing accreditation support and access to scholarships as part of a third-country solution. See United Nations, "The Global Compact on Refugees," December 2018. Additionally, UNHCR's Refugee Education 2030 Strategy sets out to advance three central goals of the compact: easing strain on host countries, strengthening refugee self-reliance, and supporting conditions in origin countries for return in dignify and safety. See UNHCR, Refugee Education 2030: A Strategy for Refugee Inclusion (Geneva: UNHCR, 2019).

30   Lena Kainz, Natalia Banulescu-Bogdan, and Kathleen Newland, The Divergent Trajectories of the Global Migration and Refugee Compacts: Implementation amid Crisis (Washington, DC: MPI, 2020).

31   This goal was strengthened by a new indicator on refugees as part of the commitment of "leaving no one behind." See UNHCR, The Sustainable Development Goals and the Global Compact on Refugees (Geneva: UNHCR, 2020).

32   United Nations, "The Global Compact on Refugees."

33   Author interview with Angélica Zevallos, Project Manager, Lima Aprende

34   Article 8 of Peru's National Constitution guarantees the right to quality education without discrimination to all. See Government of Peru, Article 8 of Peru's National Constitution. Article 9 of "Executive Decree No 1325" recognizes that "foreigners are entitled to the same fundamental rights established in the Political Constitution of Peru as nationals, such as access to health, education and work under equal conditions as nationals, except for the limitations established in the regulations in force."

35   Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuelan (R4V), "Response for Venezuelans," accessed October 2020.

36   Author interview with Angélica Zevallos, Project Manager, Lima Aprende, Peru's Ministry of Education (MINEDU), September 15, 2020.

37   UNICEF, as a member of the IOM and UNCHR-led Regional Inter-Agency Coordination Platform, had been monitoring this development. The Regional Inter-Agency Coordination Platform was launched in September 2018 to "strengthen coordination with existing humanitarian and UN architectures, main receiving authorities – at regional, national, but also at local level – civil society and local initiatives, and foster a comprehensive, predictable, and harmonized response to the plight of Venezuelans." R4V, The Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan (Buenos Aires and Panama: R4V, 2018).

38   Consequently, Peru's Ministry of Education (MINEDU) established a working group to conduct, with financial and technical support from UNICEF and UNCHR, a diagnosis of the number of Venezuelan migrant and children who were out of the school system and develop an action plan. This working group was composed by members of other departments in MINEDU and representatives from the Regional Bureau for Education in Metropolitan Lima (DRELM), given the strategic importance of Lima as the main education hub. As part of this exercise, representatives of MINEDU analyzed aggregated data from Peru's Education National Registry (SIAGE) and Peru's Migration Agency to identify the number of students who were out of school. It also conducted a survey of 500 schools in Lima in a ten-day period to assess the potential for expanding capacity in these facilities. This exercise showed that 14,000 Venezuelan migrant and refugee children in Lima were out of school, and it also identified an 9,600 additional Venezuelan children who were attending schools but who were not officially registered in the education system registry (SIAGE). Author interview with Daniel Contreras, Education Specialist, UNICEF, October 5, 2020.

39   The outreach strategy included disseminating promotional materials through social media, radio, TV, official websites, information booths at Peru's National Migration Agency, delivering pamphlets in supermarkets, public transportation, and more. MINEDU launched an online registration portal on its website so parents could register their children's information to assess the number of parties interested.

40   UNESCO "Educación inclusiva con niños venezolanos en Perú," UNESCO, July 16, 2019.

41   DRELM "Más de 6 mil niños culminaron su año escolar 2019 gracias al programa Lima Aprende," Peru Ministry of Education, February 28, 2020.

42   Author interview with Angélica Zevallos, Project Manager, Lima Aprende, Peru's Ministry of Education (MINEDU), September 15, 2020.

43   Author interview with Angélica Zevallos, Project Manager, Lima Aprende, Peru's Ministry of Education (MINEDU), September 15, 2020.

44   Author interview with Angélica Zevallos, Project Manager, Lima Aprende, Peru's Ministry of Education (MINEDU), September 15, 2020.

45   Killa Miranda Troncos, "Lima Aprende Regional Workshop," Global Forum on Migration and Development, 2019.]

46   Author interview with Angélica Zevallos, Project Manager, Lima Aprende, Peru's Ministry of Education (MINEDU), September 15, 2020.

47   Author interview with Angélica Zevallos, Project Manager, Lima Aprende, Peru's Ministry of Education (MINEDU), September 15, 2020.

48   Equilibrum CenDe, La inclusión educativa de niños, niñas y adolescents migrantes venezolanos en el Perú – una política que no se puede nombrar (Lima: Equilibrum CenDe, 2020).

49   For instance, findings show that principals and teachers were struggling to accommodate the needs of all students given the increase in enrollment. It also showed that principals and teachers needed additional guidance on how to provide emotional and academic support to newcomers given their vulnerabilities.

50   In 2016, Peru's Migration Agency went through a complete restructuring in 2016 and upgraded its technology capacity significantly.

51   UNICEF and UNHCR provided 75 percent and 15 percent each of the financial resources needed to hire enough staff to conduct the qualitative survey of 500 schools in Lima during a ten-day period. Author interview with Daniel Contreras, Education Specialist, UNICEF, October 5, 2020.

52   Cindy Huang and Nazanin Ash, Refugee Compacts: Addressing the Crisis of Protracted Displacement (Washington, DC: Center for Global Development and International Rescue Committee, 2017).

53   Durable Solutions Platform (DSP) and Columbia Program on Forced Migration and Health at the Mailman School of Public Health, In My Own Hands: A Medium-Term Approach Towards Self-Reliance and Resilience of Syrian Refugees and Host Communities in Jordan (Amman: Columbia University and DSP, 2020).

54   Author interview with Daniel Contreras, Education Specialist, UNICEF, October 5, 2020.

55   MINEDU's Institutional Management Unit is responsible for overseeing the proposal, development, and evaluation of cross-sectoral policies that support the ministry's strategic goals, such as safeguarding and upholding Peru's constitutional duty of guaranteeing access to education for all and addressing gaps in efforts to do so. It would not have been possible without the conviction of members of the working group that are responsible for this mandate.

56   Local Education Management Units (Unidad de Gestión Educativa Local in Spanish, known as UGELs) are decentralized bodies of the Regional Bureaus in Peru that oversee the implementation of national and regional education policies. Lima has seven UGELs. Given its strategic importance as host of one-third of the total student population, the Regional Bureau for Education in Metropolitan Lima (DRELM), is the only regional bureau that is heavily dependent on the Ministry of Education in its strategic planning directions and budget allocation.

57   Author interview with Angélica Zevallos, Project Manager, Lima Aprende, Peru's Ministry of Education (MINEDU), September 15, 2020.

58   Human Rights Watch, "Lebanon: Stalled Effort to Get Syrian Children in School," Human Rights Watch, December 13, 2018.

59   Maurice Crul et al., "How the Different Policies and School Systems Affect the Inclusion of Syrian Refugee Children in Sweden, Germany, Greece, Lebanon and Turkey," Comparative Migration Studies 7, no. 1 (2019).

60   Crul et al., "How the Different Policies and School Systems Affect the Inclusion of Syrian Refugee Children."

61   Durable Solutions Platform and Program on Forced Migration and Health, Columbia University Mailman School of Public Health, "In My Own Hands": A Medium-Term Approach Towards Self-Reliance and Resilience of Syrian Refugees and Host Communities in Jordan (Amman, Jordan: DSP, 2020),12.

62   Theirworld, Education for Refugees in Turkey.

63   Crul et al., "Different Policies and School Systems Affect the Inclusion of Syrian Refugee Children.".

64   DSP and Columbia Program on Forced Migration and Health, "In My Own Hands."

65   Author interview with Angélica Zevallos, Project Manager, Lima Aprende, Peru's Ministry of Education (MINEDU), September 15, 2020.

66   Uganda Ministry of Education and Sports, Education Response Plan for Refugees and Host Communities in Uganda (Kampala: Ministry of Education and Sports, 2018).

67   Uganda Ministry of Education and Sports, Education Response Plan for Refugees and Host Communities in Uganda.

68   Leah Rodriguez, "Uganda Needs More Education Funding to Support Refugees, UN Says," Global Citizen, February 8, 2019; UNHCR, "Uganda Comprehensive Refugee Response Portal," accessed 14 December, 2020.

69   Approximately 161 pupils for every classroom and around 88 pupils per teacher. For example, in Yumbe District, the school-aged population has more than doubled since early 2016 and in some government primary schools near refugee settlements, refugee learners outnumber those from the host community. See Uganda Ministry of Education and Sports, Education Response Plan.

70   UNICEF, "New fund launches to address global education crisis" (press release, May 23, 2016); Education Cannot Wait, "What You Need To Know: Engaging in Country Allocations for the First Response Window," accessed January 13, 2021.

71   The Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) also signalled a paradigm shift from a mainly humanitarian focus to the development of integrated services for the long term.

72   Uganda Ministry of Education and Sports, Education Response Plan.

73   Uganda Ministry of Education and Sports, Education Response Plan; Save the Children et al., "The Education Response Plan for Refugees and Host Communities in Uganda (ERP) - A call to action from NGOs to the international community" (statement, Save the Children et al., September 2018).

74   The plan outlines three key output themes, each comprised of activities to achieve these goals: (1) Improved equitable access to inclusive relevant learning opportunities: This objective is focused on expanding access through skills training, academic materials, the construction of schools (both semi-permanent and permanent classrooms), and efforts to ensure the accessibility and safety of schools, including by recognizing the needs of disabled children. Other key features include double-shifting 30 percent of primary and secondary schools and segregating WASH facilities by gender. (2) Improved delivery of quality education and training: These activities include the improvement of teacher salaries, materials, recruitment, and training (including on refugee-specific needs), the enhancement of school governance and pedagogy, as well as resources for school clubs. (3) Strengthened system for effective delivery: This goal is centered around institutional development at the district and national level, comprised of activities including policy advocacy on refugee inclusion and teacher ceilings, support for planning and coordination in districts, data management and evaluations, and improved community participation. See Ministry of Education and Sports, Education Response Plan.

75   This component seeks to address the need to train, register and licence refugee teachers who often serve as classroom assistants in Uganda since their qualifications are not recognised. See Uganda Ministry of Education and Sports, Education Response Plan.

76   Uganda Ministry of Education and Sports, "ERP – Year 1 Brochure" (brochure, Ministry of Education and Sports, December 2019).

77   Author interview with ERP Secretariat and Education Officer at UNHCR, August 2020; Ministry of Education and Sports, "ERP – Year 1 Brochure"; ERP 2020 Progress Report (not publicly available).

78   Author interview with Education Officer at UNHCR, September 2020.

79   Jessica Oddy, Accelerated Education Programming (AEP): Children, Families, Teachers and Educational Stakeholders Experiences of AEP in Uganda (London: Save the Children, 2019).

80   Uganda Ministry of Education and Sports, "ERP – Year 1 Brochure."

81   Level one equates to the first three years of primary school, level two to the 4th and 5th years, and level three represents the remaining 6th and 7th year. Local Ugandans and refugees attend classes together. See Oddy, Accelerated Education Programming; European Commission, "The Accelerated Learning Program: improving integration through education" (news release, March 23, 2018).

82   Oddy, Accelerated Education Programming.

83   Uganda Education Response Plan Steering Committee / Uganda Ministry of Education and Sports, "Global Refugee Forum Education Response Plan Good Practice" (news release, Uganda Ministry of Education, Geneva, December 2019).

84   Finn Church Aid, Norwegian Refugee Council, Save the Children, and War Child Holland, INCLUDE (INnovative and inCLUsive accelerated eDucation programmE for refugee and host community children) – Baseline Report (Uganda: European Union Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid, 2018); Oddy, Accelerated Education Programming.

85   Uganda Ministry of Education and Sports, "ERP – Year 1 Brochure."

86   Uganda Ministry of Education and Sports, Education Response.

87   ERP 2020 Progress Report (not publicly available).

88   Ministry of Education and Sports, Framework For Provision Of Continued Learning During The Covid-19 Lockdown In Uganda (Kampala: Ministry of Education and Sports, 2020).

89   According to Education Cannot Wait, half of the primary school refugee children in Uganda have yet to receive home learning materials. And especially in Uganda's largely informal economy, where many households face heightened risks of food insecurity due to the effects of COVID-19, early gains of the ERP might get lost as some children will need to work to support their families. See Education Cannot Wait, "Education Cannot Wait Investments Reach Refugee and Other Vulnerable Children and Youth in Response to COVID-19 Pandemic," accessed January 6, 2021; Maintains Programme, "Meet Connie – Coordinator at the Education Response Plan for Refugees and Host Communities Secretariat," updated July 1, 2020.

90   Wambi Michael, "Uganda's School Plan for Refugee Children Could Become a Global Template" (news release, December 21, 2020).

91   Thomas Calvot, Hidden victims of the Syrian crisis: disabled, injured and older refugees (Beirut and Amman: HelpAge International and Handicap International, 2014).

92   Nicholas Crawford, Sorcha O'Callaghan, Kerrie Holloway, and Christina Lowe, "The Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework Progress in Uganda" (HPG Working Paper, Humanitarian Policy Group and Overseas Development Institute, London, September 2019).

93   Uganda Ministry of Education and Sports, "ERP – Year 1 Brochure."

94   Uganda Ministry of Education and Sports, Education Response Plan.

95   UNESCO, QED Solutions, and Uganda Ministry of Education and Sports, Strengthening the Capacity of the Teaching Workforce in Primary and Secondary Schools for Conflict Sensitive Education (Kampala: UNESCO and EU Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations [DG ECHO], 2019).

96   For example, the ERP enhances teacher's capacity in social and emotional learning as well as psychosocial support. See Uganda Ministry of Education and Sports, Education Response Plan.

97   UNHCR, "Education Dashboard," September 2020.

98   Wannes Carlier, The Widening Educational Gap for Syrian Refugee Children (Amsterdam: Kids Rights Foundation, 2018); Khawaja, "Growing Up Without an Education."

99   Uganda Ministry of Education and Sports, Education Response Plan.

100   Maintains Programme, "Uganda," accessed December 12, 2020.

101   Other advocacy efforts are described in more detail in the ERP Plan. See Uganda Ministry of Education and Sports, Education Response Plan.

102   ERP 2020 Progress Report (not publicly available).

103   Some countries in the region, such as Jordan, already have experience with this by developing an annual monitoring and evaluation framework under the Education Strategic Plan. However, recent reports have pointed to concerns among Syrian caregivers that schools in Jordan are not sufficiently monitoring and evaluating learning outcomes, instead focus on registering attendance rates. See Small, "I Want to Continue to Study"; No Lost Generation, "Syria Crisis Education Strategic Paper - London 2016 Conference" (strategic paper, No Lost Generation, London, 2016); Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Ministry of Education, Education Strategic Plan 2018-2022.

104   Uganda Ministry of Education and Sports, Education Response Plan.

105   Author interview with Adamu Tefera, My Education Project Officer, Center for Multicultural Youth (CMY), September 28, 2020.

106   Author interview with Adamu Tefera, My Education Project Officer, Center for Multicultural Youth (CMY), September 28, 2020.

107   Australia resettled 12,700 refugees in 2018 and 18,200 refugees in 2019. See UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018 (Geneva: UNHCR, 2019); UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2019 (Geneva: UNHCR, 2020).

108   Refugee Council of Australia, "Settling in Australia: The Challenges" (guide, Surry Hills, Australia, 2019).

109   See, for example, Ian Fordham, "Out-of-School-Hours Learning in the United Kingdom," New Directions for Youth Development 2004, no. 101 (2004): 43–74; Jennifer McCombs, Anamarie Whitaker, and Paul Yoo, The Value of Out-of-School Time Programs (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2017).

110   Lucie Cerna, "Refugee Education: Integration Models and Practices in OECD Countries" (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD] Education Working Paper No. 203, OECD Publishing, Paris, 2019).

111   See, for example, Cerna, "Refugee Education"; Bridging Refugee Youth and Children's Services, "Promising Practices in After-School Programming for Refugee Youth and Children," accessed October 23, 2020.

112   UNHCR's education programming and associated strategies still advocate for out-of-school-hours learning support programs (OSHLSPs) targeting refugees. See, for example, UNHCR, 2018 Annual Report: UNHCR – Educate a Child Program (Geneva: UNHCR, 2019); Global Refugee Forum Education Co-Sponsorship Alliance, Global Framework for Refugee Education (Geneva: UNHCR, 2019).

113   Roughly 33 percent of national intake of refugees and asylum seekers settle in Victoria. See Victoria Department of Health and Human Services, "Refugee and Asylum Seeker Settlement in Victoria" (frequently asked questions, Victoria, August 2016).

114   Refugee Education Partnership Project (REPP), The Education Needs of Young Refugees in Victoria (Brunswick: Victorian Foundation for Survivors of Torture, Inc, 2007); Pam Luizzi, I Wish It Was Every Day…: Case Studies from Out of School Hours Learning Support Programs (Carlton, Australia: REPP and Centre for Multicultural Youth Issues, 2007).

115   REPP, The Education Needs of Young Refugees.

116   REPP, The Education Needs of Young Refugees.

117   At the time, the organization was called Centre for Multicultural Youth Issues (CMYi).

118   Author interview with Adamu Tefera, My Education Project Officer, Center for Multicultural Youth (CMY), September 28, 2020.

119   Centre for Multicultural Youth, "Learning Beyond the Bell," accessed January 4, 2021.

120   Centre for Multicultural Youth, State of the Sector: Out-of-School-Hours Learning Support 2018 (Carlton, Australia: CMY, 2018).

121   Author interview with Adamu Tefera, My Education Project Officer, Center for Multicultural Youth (CMY), September 28, 2020.

122   Centre for Multicultural Youth, "Learning Beyond the Bell."

123   Author interview with Adamu Tefera, My Education Project Officer, Center for Multicultural Youth (CMY), September 28, 2020.

124   Centre for Multicultural Youth, State of the Sector.

125   See, for example, Centre for Multicultural Youth, State of the Sector; Centre for Multicultural Youth, "Case Study: Thomastown West Community Hub EAL Homework Club," accessed October 23, 2020; John Mc. Consulting, "My Homework Club Is a Cool Place to Go to Now." Best Practice Case Studies of Homework Clubs (Carlton, Australia: Centre for Multicultural Youth, 2011); Centre for Multicultural Youth, "Case Study: Banksia Gardens-Broadmeadows Study Group," accessed October 23, 2020. The Government of Victoria is planning on commissioning an evaluation of its refugee education programming, including Learning Beyond the Bell (LBB), in the coming years.

Author interview with Jemma Wiseman, Senior Policy and Program Officer, Multicultural and Civics Unit, Department of Education and Training, Government of Victoria, October 6, 2020.

126   The format, leadership, and structure of these consultations vary depending on the targeted community. Newly arrived refugee communities will likely not have the leadership structures present in more established refugee communities, so adjustments may be needed in the way consultations are conducted. Author interview with Adamu Tefera, My Education Project Officer, Center for Multicultural Youth (CMY), September 28, 2020.

127   Centre for Multicultural Youth, "Case Study: Dixon House Homework Club," accessed January 5, 2021.

128   Centre for Multicultural Youth, A Coordinator's Guide to Out-of-School-Hours Learning Support Programs (Carlton, Australia: Centre for Multicultural Youth, 2016).

129   Centre for Multicultural Youth, A Coordinator's Guide to OSHLSPs.

130   For more on the impact of tutoring, see Chloe S. Gordon, Matthew Pink, and Sandra C. Jones, "Children and Tutor's Perspective on a Homework Support Program in Melbourne: A University-School Partnership," Health & Social Care in the Community 28, no. 5 (2020).

131   Centre for Multicultural Youth, A Coordinator's Guide to OSHLSPs.

132   This text uses the term "informal" to refer to educational programming that is supplemental to formal education, whether that formal education run by governments, NGOs, international organizations, or other actors.

133   Dhingra, "Worsening Gaps in Education for Syrian Refugees."

134   Author interview with Adamu Tefera, My Education Project Officer, Center for Multicultural Youth (CMY), September 28, 2020.

135   Foundation House, "School's in for Refugees," accessed October 13, 2020.

136   Author interview with Jemma Wiseman, Senior Policy and Program Officer, Multicultural and Civics Unit, Department of Education and Training, Government of Victoria, October 6, 2020. For more information, see Victoria State Government Education and Training, "Supporting Students from Refugee Backgrounds," updated August 12, 2020.

137   Small, "I Want to Continue to Study."

138   European Commission, "EU Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis: Higher and further education," accessed January 13, 2021

139   The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, Jordan Response Plan for the Syria Crisis 2020-2022 (Amman: Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, 2020).

140   Ibid.

141   European Commission, "EU Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis."

142   Ahmad Al-Hawamdeh and Hana A. El-Ghali, Higher Education and Syrian Refugee Students: The Case of Jordan (Policies, Practices, and Perspectives) (Beirut: UNHCR and UNESCO, 2017); Government of Lebanon and United Nations, Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2017-2020 (2020 update).

143   HOPES is implemented by the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) in collaboration with the British Council, Campus France, and Nuffic. DAAD, as the project coordinator, led the HOPES project and acted as the central project office in Amman. It was mainly responsible for the award of scholarships and counselling of prospective students, as well as financial management and reporting to the European Union. The British Council implemented the project, including the English language courses, through its offices in Egypt and Northern Iraq. Campus France took responsibility for communication and the organization of stakeholder dialogues via its office in Lebanon. Finally, NUFFIC organised the support of smaller, innovative projects in the five countries in which HOPES operates through its Ankara office. HOPES-LEB is implemented by the same partners, but it focuses only on Lebanon. See DAAD, "HOPES – Higher and Further Education Opportunities and Perspectives for Syrians," accessed January 13, 2021.

144   DAAD, British Council, Campus France, and Nuffic, "HOPES – Higher and Further Education Opportunities and Perspectives for Syrians" (fact sheet, 2018).

145   DAAD, "HOPES – Higher and Further Education Opportunities and Perspectives for Syrians."

146   DAAD, Campus France, and Nuffic, "The HOPES-LEB Project," accessed January 13, 2021.

147   DAAD, "Higher and Further Education Opportunities and Perspectives for Syrians and vulnerable youth in Lebanon," accessed January 13, 2021.

148   EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis, "An Integrated Pathway for Higher Education in Turkey" (fact sheet, EU Regional Trust Fund, Turkey, 2019).

149   EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis, "Higher Education and Vocational Training Program for vulnerable Syrian and Jordanian youth (EDU-SYRIA II)" (fact sheet, Jordan, 2019).

150   European Union and Particip Consortium, External Monitoring and Evaluation for the European Union Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis, the 'Madad Fund' – Evaluation of Madad-Funded Programmes/Projects for Higher Education (Brussels: European Union, 2018).

151   European Union and Particip Consortium, External Monitoring and Evaluation. A high share (82 percent) of respondents was still unemployed following the initial HOPES project.

 DAAD reported that only 12 percent of Syrian students in Jordan who benefited from a HOPES scholarship had access to the labor market after graduation.

152   Author interview with Maxime Montagner, International Aid/Cooperation Officer, EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis, Directorate-General for Neighborhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR), European Commission, August 20, 2020.

153   Out of ten scholarships for Syrians, three or four were granted to Jordanians. Author interview with Dr Carsten-Michael Walbiner, Project Director, HOPES/HOPES-LEB, August 27, 2020.

154   Author interview with Dr Carsten-Michael Walbiner, Project Director, HOPES/HOPES-LEB, August 27, 2020.

155   Author interview with Maxime Montagner, International Aid/Cooperation Officer, EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis, DG NEAR, European Commission, August 20, 2020.

156   Author interview with Dr Carsten-Michael Walbiner, Project Director, HOPES/HOPES-LEB, August 27, 2020.

157   Author interview with Dr Carsten-Michael Walbiner, Project Director, HOPES/HOPES-LEB, August 27, 2020.

158   Author interview with Dr Carsten-Michael Walbiner, Project Director, HOPES/HOPES-LEB, August 27, 2020. These links also allowed the HOPES partners to organize events directly involving policymakers from the region and EU Member States, including a conference HOPES contributed to organizing in 2018, hosted by the Germany Ministry of Foreign Affairs, about refugees and higher education.

159   European Union and Particip Consortium, External Monitoring and Evaluation.

160   Author interview with Maxime Montagner, International Aid/Cooperation Officer, EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis, DG NEAR, European Commission, August 20, 2020.

161   The World Bank, "Unemployment, youth total (% of total labor force ages 15-24) (modeled ILO estimate) - Lebanon," updated September 20, 2020.

162   The World Bank, "Unemployment, youth total (% of total labor force ages 15-24) (modeled ILO estimate) – Jordan," updated September 20, 2020.